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INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CRITICAL 
DIFFERENCES 
A. 0. Adede* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent article, commenting extensively on a leading British 
case, American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., 1 the object of an 
interlocutory injunction was stated as follows: 
The object of an interlocutory injunction is to protect the plain-
tiff from irreparable loss during the inevitable delay pending the 
determination of his claim against the defendant. Since the defen-
dant's interests might be prejudiced by a restraint that later proves 
to have been legally unwarranted, the plaintiff usually has to give 
an undertaking to reimburse the defendant's losses if his action is 
unsuccessful at the trial. It is usually impracticable for the judge to 
reach a definite conclusion on the issue at stake in interlocutory 
proceedings, especially if there is a conflict of evidence, but it is 
possible to consider whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; in 
the past it has not been uncommon for extended and exhaustive 
analysis of the legal issues to be undertaken in interlocutory pro-
ceedings. If the judge was satisfied that the plaintiff had sufficiently 
established his legal case, he would consider whether the "balance 
of convenience" between the parties was in favour of the granting 
of an injunction. 2 
Leaving aside, for a moment, the issue concerning the precise 
meaning of "prima facie, "3 the above passage succinctly describes 
• B.A. Juniata College (1965); M.A. (1966), M.A.L.D. (1967), Ph.D. (1970), the Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy; LL.B. Boston University School of Law ( 1971). Formerly Head 
of the Legal Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya. Currently of the 
Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, New York. The views expressed herein 
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Organization. 
1. [1975] A.C. 396, [1975] 1 All E.R. 504. 
2. Wallington, Injunctions and the "Right to Demonstrate," 35 CAMB. L.J. 82, 83 (1976) 
(emphasis added & footnote omitted). The omitted footnote stated that an undertaking is 
not required if the plaintiff is the Crown acting to enforce the law. Id. at 83, n. 7. 
3. The traditional rule of interlocutory injunctions, which required the plaintiff to show 
that he "has a prima facie case" as stated above, and the implications of the new rule laid 
down in the Cyanamid case, which requires the plaintiff to show only that "his case is not 
frivolous or vexatious" or that "there is a serious question to be tried," will be discussed at 
notes 32-63 infra and accompanying text. 
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not only the purpose, but also the traditional rule governing inter-
locutory injunctions under common law. The points made therein 
will serve as a useful basis for showing the differences between such 
proceedings and interim measures of protection under international 
adjudication. 
It should be observed at the outset that the introduction of 
proceedings for interim measures in international adjudication was 
based on the need for a remedy analogous to the common law inter-
locutory injunction. The latter relied upon the rationale that parties 
to a dispute are to be enjoined pendente lite from taking any action 
which would prejudice the effectiveness of the judgment ultimately 
rendered on the merits of the case. As has been pointed out else-
where, 4 the need to introduce such a remedy in the context of inter-
national litigation was felt because the length of time which passed 
between the institution of proceedings and the rendering of a final 
judgment by the Permanent Court of International Justice or its 
successor, the International Court of Justice, was often months or 
even years. 5 Thus, in order to preserve the respective rights of par-
ties to the dispute pending litigation, Article 41 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, which was copied virtually verbatim 
from Article 41 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, gave the Court the jurisdictional power to indicate 
provisional measures, as follows: 
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers 
that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which 
ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested 
shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council. 6 
The available records show th&t, in its lifetime, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice was called upon to apply Article 41 
only six times.7 The International Court of Justice, at the time of 
4. Mendelson, Interim Measures of Protection in Cases of Contested Jurisdiction, 46 
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 259 (1972-73). 
5. Although the Court recently amended its Rules of Procedure to remove some of the 
requirements which encouraged lengthy delays in the Court's proceedings, the time element 
in the litigations before the Court is still a matter of concern. For the text of the amendments 
to the Rules of Procedure adopted in 1972, see 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 899 (1972). For an 
analysis of the amendments, see Jimenez de Arechaga, The Amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973). 
6. l.C.J. STAT. art. 41. 
7. Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2nd, 1865, between China and Belgium, 
(1927) P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 8 (Interim Order); Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w 
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this writing, has considered applying the Article seven times.8 The 
arguments presented in the orders of these two Courts and the deci-
sions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, 9 either indicating interim 
measures or declining to do so, illustrate one important point: there 
are certain considerations which are only appropriate in the context 
of interlocutory injunctions proceedings and not for interim 
measures proceedings, and vice versa. 
In the Cyanamid case, the House of Lords rejected the old 
prima facie test for interlocutory injunctions in favor of the more 
lenient requirement that the plaintiff need only show "that there is 
a serious question to be tried." 10 However, British courts in subse-
quent cases have had difficulty in applying this test and have cited 
"special factors" in reverting to the use of the prima facie test. 11 
Similarly, the recent Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. 
Turkey) 12 demonstrates the divisions among the Justices of the In-
ternational Court of Justice regarding the tests propounded for the 
granting of interim measures of protection. The next section of this 
Article will focus upon the critical differences between proceedings 
in these two forums, having regard to the analogous nature of the 
remedy in question. 
(Indemnities) (1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 12 (Interim Order); Legal Status of the South-
Eastern Territory of Greenland, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 48 (Interim Order); Case 
Concerning the Administration of Prince von Pless, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 54 (Interim 
Order); Case Concerning the Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority, [1933] 
P.C.l.J., ser. A/B, No. 58 (Interim Order); The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, 
(1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 79 (Interim Order). 
8. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1951] l.C.J. 89 (Interim Protection); Interhandel Case, 
(1957] l.C.J. 105 (Interim Protection); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1972] l.C.J. 12, 30 
(Interim Protection); Nuclear Test Case, (1973] l.C.J. 99 (Interim Protection); Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case, [1973] l.C.J. 302 (Continuance of Interim Protection); Case Concerning 
Trial of Pakistan Prisoners of War, [1973] l.C.J. 328 (Interim Protection); Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf Case, [1976] l.C.J. 3 (Interim Protection) (Greece v. Turkey). 
9. The cases before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals on which requests for interim measures 
were made were: Leon von Tiedemant v. Polish State, 3 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 596, 607 (1925); 
Frauenverein Szamothly v. Polish State, 6 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 326 (1925); Ungarische Erdgas 
A.G. v. Roumanian State, 5 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 591 (1925); Count Hadik Barcozy v. Czechoslo-
vakian State (1927), reported in 32 REVUEGENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 35 (1928); 
Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada) 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1907 (1938). An arbitral tri-
bunal constituted under the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
also dealt with a request for interim measures in the case of Holiday Inns, S.A. v. Morocco, 
reported in INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, (1972-73] 
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 21-22. 
10. [1975] A.C. 396, 407, (1975] 1 All E.R. 504, 510. See notes 32-42 infra and accompa-
nying text. 
11. See notes 43-63 infra and accompanying text. 
12. [1976] l.C.J. 3. See notes 77-86 infra and accompanying text. 
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II. THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCES 
A. The Problem of Jurisdiction-Consent and Urgency 
The sole basis for international adjudication is the consent of a 
state to be sued. Thus, the determination of the nature and scope 
of the consent given by a state with respect to a certain forum is 
always a crucial issue in international proceedings. Accordingly, the 
question of whether a particular international forum has jurisdic-
tion to entertain a request for interim measures has remained a 
source of difficulty. This is especially true when such requests are 
made before the forum itself has had the opportunity to determine 
its competence in the case. 13 
In contrast, the problem of jurisdiction is not always as critical 
in domestic interlocutory injunction proceedings as it is with in-
terim measures. This is because a plaintiff who seeks the remedy of 
an interlocutory injunction will always go to a court or a tribunal 
upon which domestic law has clearly conferred jurisdiction. A ques-
tion of jurisdiction may, however, arise in a case where the defen-
dant, for example, claims sovereign immunity, or, as in the United 
States, in the context of competing jurisdiction between federal and 
state courts. 14 Except in such cases, domestic courts in injunction 
proceedings have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute 
conferred on them specifically by law, independent of the consent 
of the parties. The same is clearly not true with respect to interna-
tional courts and tribunals. 
A crucial difference exists, therefore, between international 
proceedings for interim measures and interlocutory injunction pro-
ceedings under domestic law. Since the latter are not usually bogged 
down with issues of jurisdiction arising from the lack of consent of 
any of the parties, domestic proceedings move directly to the deter-
mination of whether or not the plaintiff's prayer for injunction is to 
be granted. 
Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Rules of the International Court 
of Justice provides that a request for interim measures shall have 
priority over all other cases and shall be treated as a matter of 
13. The extent of the Court's jurisdiction in general is beyond the scope of this Article. 
This issue has been exhaustively discussed by Mendelson, supra note 4, passim. 
14. For discussions of the latter, see ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 172-74 (1969); Case Comment, Garrett v. Bamford, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 616 (1977) . 
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urgency.15 The consideration of urgency, which admittedly charac-
terizes proceedings for interim measures, has evidently played a 
crucial part in the formulation of the test to be applied by interna-
tional forums for deciding the important question of jurisdiction. 
Relying upon the element of urgency, some have argued that 
delaying the indication of interim measures until the forum in ques-
tion has resolved the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter 
may prejudice the rights of the applicant. 16 If no quick action is 
taken to maintain the status quo, such a delay would prevent the 
applicant from enjoying adequate benefit from the judgment ulti-
mately rendered. 
To counter the above argument, others have urged that the 
forum's prior determination of substantive jurisdiction, before an 
indication of interim measures, is important for several reasons. 17 
First, it would be unfair to the defendant if his interests were preju-
diced by interim measures prescribed by a forum which is later 
found to have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. 
There. would be no way of compensating the defendant since pro-
ceedings for interim measures, unlike those for interlocutory injunc-
tions, do not require the plaintiff to furnish an undertaking to reim-
burse the defendant in cases where the restraint is later found to 
have been legally unwarranted. 18 Moreover, the indication of in-
terim measures, without prior establishment of substantive jurisdic-
tion, may be seen as glossing over tlie important element of consent, 
which protects states against being defendants in any international 
proceedings in a forum to which they have not clearly given consent 
to be sued. Second, it would indeed be damaging to the prestige of 
15. I.C.J. R. 66, para. 2. Rule 66 further elaborates how the Court is to exercise its power 
conferred by Article 41 of the Statute of the Court. For the text of Article 41, see text 
accompanying note 6 supra. 
16. This argument is summarized by Mendelson, supra note 4, at 311. 
17. This argument is summarized by Mendelson, supra note 4, at 311-13. The two posi-
tions are compared, id. at 314-20. 
18. For a summary of this rule, see text accompanying note 32 infra. One author, how-
ever, has specifically suggested the adoption of this domestic rule which requires such an 
undertaking by the plaintiff. See Hambro, The Binding Character of the Provisional Mea-
sures of Protection Indicated by the International Court of Justice, in RECHTSFRAGEN DER 
INTERNATIONAL EN ORGANISATION 170-71 (H. von Walter Schatzel & H.-J. Schlochauer eds. 
1956). Hambro argues that 
Id . 
the party which has requested the Court to indicate provisional measures will be 
under an obligation to recompense the other for all damage it may have suffered 
from, having complied with the provisional measures in a case where it wins the suit 
or where the Court declares itself to be without jurisdiction on the merits. 
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the forum itself if it adopted the practice of indicating interim mea-
sures in cases over which it is later found to have lacked substantive 
jurisdiction. 
In attempting to bring a balanced approach to this issue of 
jurisdiction, having regard to the competing considerations noted 
above, judges have applied the two tests identified below. 
1. THE ICJ's TESTS FOR RESOLVING THE IssuE oF JuRISDICTION 
One of the tests for jurisdiction is that, before the forum from 
which the remedy of interim measures is sought can deny the rem-
edy, it must be demonstrated that the case is a priori outside the 
jurisdiction of the forum. 19 This would be done "only if, by virtue 
of some well-established principle to the undisputed facts, the con-
trary is virtually unarguable-for example, if the matter is clearly 
within the 'reserved domain'. " 20 We may refer to this as the "a 
priori" test. 
In contrast, the "prima facie" test states that, before the forum 
in which an application for interim measures is made can withhold 
the indication of such measures, it must be shown that there is a 
prima facie total lack of jurisdiction.21 This depends upon how the 
term prima facie is used; it may "be taken as meaning that the test 
is whether, on a preliminary examination, the case seems on balance 
to be outside the Court's jurisdiction .... "22 
Detailed discussion of the merits of these tests is beyond the 
scope of this analysis. We may, however, observe briefly that a claim 
has been made that more cases would be declared to be outside the 
Court's jurisdiction by the "primE;t facie" showing test23 than by the 
19. See, e.g., Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1951] I.C.J. 89, 92-93 (Interim Protection). 
20. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 271. 
21. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1972] I.C.J. 12, 15-16 (Interim Protection). 
22. Id. 
23. The prima facie showing of jurisdiction test may be said to turn into the actual 
examination of the real possibility of jurisdiction being relied on by the applicant. Thus, it 
is a more difficult test to apply than the a priori test. The Court has used both a "positive" 
and "negative" version of the prima facie test. The positive version is somewhat vaguer; it 
states that interim measures will not be indicated unless the provisions invoked by the 
applicant appear prima facie to afford a basis on which the Court's jurisdiction might be 
founded. See, e.g., Nuclear Test Cases, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 101 (Interim Protection). The test 
was discussed at length by Judge Lauterpacht many years earlier. Interhandel Case, [1957] 
I.C.J. 105, 118-19 (Interim Protection) (Lauterpacht, J., sep. opinion). In contrast, the nega-
tive version is quite clear; interim measures are not to be granted if prima facie the absence 
of jurisdiction is manifest. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1972] I.C.J. 12, 15-16 
(Interim Protection). 
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decision "a priori test."24 The writer who made this claim ultimately 
concludes, and I agree, that 
the Court ought not to fetter its discretion to determine whether 
"circumstances require" the indication of interim measures by lay-
ing down a hard-and-fast rule as to what degree of likelihood of 
substantive jurisdiction will or will not satisfy it ("manifest" cases 
apart). Policy, as well as the letter and spirit of Article 41 of the 
Statute, call for a flexible approach, in which all relevant factors are 
taken into consideration and given their proper weight. 25 
Another writer has correctly observed that it is still not clear 
exactly what amounts to a prima facie showing of jurisdiction and 
asks the following pertinent question: 
Is it enough that the applicant be able to point to a provision or set 
of provisions in a treaty or declaration indicating a formal possibil-
ity of jurisdiction; or is the Court concerned also with a real possibil-
ity of jurisdiction, that is, is the degree of legal controversy over the 
applicability of the jurisdictional provisions relevant?28 
One thing, however, seems clear. Judges have not found it pos-
sible to give their full benediction to the idea that a tribunal or a 
court is entitled to indicate interim measures before the forum has 
settled the question of its jurisdiction over the merits of the case. 
This is supported by the record in the recent 1976 order of the 
International Court of Justice in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
I 
Case27 to be discussed more extensively in the next section. For the 
present argument, it need merely be observed that the Court's order 
rejecting Greece's application for interim measures was by a vote of 
twelve to one. 28 Of the twelve judges voting with the majority, eight 
delivered separate opinions. 29 Of the eight separate opinions, six 
24. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 271. Under the a priori test, the forum could consider it 
sufficient if the applicant invokes a bilateral treaty or a compromis indicating patent jurisdic-
tion. Since under this test the forum may not even find it necessary to determine whether 
or not the treaties or the compromis cited are still valid as between the parties, it is arguably 
a less formidable test. See, e.g., Anglo-American Oil Co. Case, [1951] l.C.J. 89, 92-93 (In-
terim Protection). 
25. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 322. 
26. Goldsworthy, Interim Measures of Protection in the International Court of Justice, 
68 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 265 (1974). 
27. [1976] I.C.J. 3 (Interim Protection). For a more extensive discussion, see notes 64-
86 infra and accompanying text. 
28. (1976] l.C.J. at 14. 
29. Id. at 15-16 (Jiminez de Arechaga), 17-18 (Nagendra Singh), 19-20 (Lachs), 21-22 
(Morozov), 23 (Ruda), 24-26 (Mosler), 27-30 (Elias), 31-34 (Tarazi). 
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were delivered by judges who stressed the importance of the deter-
mination of the Court's substantive jurisdiction before it could indi-
cate interim measures.30 
B. The Concept of Irreparable Harm and the Question of 
Balancing of Convenience-the Cyanamid Case 
Both in the context of interlocutory injunctions and of interim 
measures proceedings the question of the showing of irreparable 
harm is a major consideration. Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, 
as we have seen, states that the provisional measures are for preserv-
ing "the respective rights of either party" to the dispute.31 Addition-
ally, the preservation of rights seems to be tied to the showing of 
irreparable harm by the plaintiff, as will be demonstrated shortly 
in the ensuing discussion. 
The test set out at the beginning of this Article, which de-
scribed both the object of and the rule on interlocutory injunctions, 
referred to the concept of "balance of convenience." The test also 
includes the requirement that the plaintiff undertake in advance to 
reimburse the defendant in case the injunction granted turns out, 
on the merits of the case, to have been legally unwarranted. A fur-
ther examination of this issue discloses that the possibility of declar-
ing a restraint to be legally unwarranted, necessitating compensa-
tion to the defendant, is related to the concept of the "balance of 
convenience" and is ultimately tied to the question of irreparable 
harm. One writer has summarized Lord Diplock's approach to the 
"balance of convenience" in Cyanamid as follows: 
First, if the plaintiff would be adequately compensated by damages 
which the defendant could be expected to meet, an injunction 
should be refused. Second, if the defendant would likewise be com-
pensated by plaintiff's undertaking, an injunction should be 
granted. Only if there is likely to be uncompensable loss on both 
sides need the respective interests of the parties be weighed and the 
most important factor will be the desirability of preserving the 
status quo as it was before the defendant's alleged wrong.32 
The facts of the Cyanamid case may be summarized briefly. 33 
30. The six judges were Jimenez de Arechaga, Nagendra Singh, Morozov, Ruda, Mosler, 
and Tarazi. 
31. I.C.J. STAT. art. 41. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. 
32. Wallington, supra note 2, at 84. See American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., 
[1975) A.C. 396, 408-09, (1975] 1 All E.R. 504, 510-11. 
33. [1975] A.C. at 397-98, (1975] 1 All E.R. at 506-07. 
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In 1966, the British subsidiary of American Cyanamid Co. (Cy-
anamid) registered a patent in the United Kingdom for the use, as 
absorbable surgical sutures, of filaments made of a particular kind 
of chain polymer called a polyhydroxyacetic ester (PHAE). This 
product became so popular that Cyanamid captured 15 percent of 
the market. A rival company, Ethicon Ltd., which had been the 
main supplier of catgut sutures in the United Kingdom, then intro-
duced its own artificial suture, XLG. Consequently, Cyanamid, al-
leging infringement of its patent, brought an action against Ethicon 
for an injunction to restrain the marketing of XLG by Ethicon. 
Patent Judge Graham held that Cyanamid had made out a strong 
prima facie case against Ethicon and granted an interlocutory in-
junction in favor of Cyanamid.34 On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
(Russell, Stephenson, L.JJ ., and Forster, J .) reversed on the 
grounds that the evidence did not indicate that Cyanamid had 
made out a prima facie case.35 The House of Lords then allowed the 
subsequent appeal by Cyanamid and reinstated the injunction orig-
inally .granted by Judge Graham.36 
In its decision upholding the injunction, the House of Lords 
rejected its prima facie test and set forth the new rule which now 
requires that a plaintiff need only show that "the claim is not frivo-
lous or vexatious, in other words that there is a serious question to 
be tried."37 
The House of Lords found that a serious question to be tried 
existed: the evidence indicated that there was much unquantifiable 
damage which Cyanamid would suffer if an injunction were re-
fused. 38 Moreover, it was the view of their Lordships that, if Ethi-
con's product, XLG, were allowed to continue on the market, Cy-
34. Id. at 404, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 507. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 409-10, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 511-12. 
37. Id. at 407, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 510. Referring to the prima facie rule which had 
governed until that time, Lord Diplock said: 
Your Lordships should in my view take this opportunity of declaring that there 
is no such rule. The use of such expressions as "a probability," "a prima facie case," 
or "a strong prima facie case" in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power 
to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be 
achieved by this form of temporary relief. The court no doubt must be satisfied that 
the claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question 
to be tried. 
Id. Oddly, their Lordships did not discuss their holding in Stratford v. Lindley, [1965] A.C. 
269, [1964] 3 All E.R. 102, which set forth the prima facie test. 
38. [1975] A.C. at 409-10, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 511-12. 
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anamid might find it difficult to enforce a permanent injunction, 
since the damaging effect on its good will would induce doctors to 
abandon the Cyanamid product, PHAE, which they had found use-
ful.39 Ethicon would not suffer greatly; since XLG was not yet on the 
market at the time of the suit, no workers would be laid off and no 
factories would have to be closed as a result of an injunction. 40 
Announcing this new rule in which Lords Cross, Salmon, and 
Edmund-Davies, and Viscount Dilhourne concurred, Lord Diplock 
stated specifically that the decision was applicable to all cases of 
interlocutory injunctions.41 Thus, Cyanamid is now the law in the 
United Kingdom. However, as will be discussed shortly, 42 subse-
quent British case law indicates that the application of the 
Cyanamid test has already presented some difficulties. 
Apart from the importance of preserving the status quo, it is 
extremely doubtful that the rule of the "balance of convenience," 
as emphasized in Cyanamid, would be appropriate in international 
proceedings for interim measures. The rule of finding 
"uncompensable loss to both sides," and exclusive consideration of 
plaintiff's and defendant's ability to pay monetary damages to each 
other, would bring undesirable results in proceedings for interim 
measures. The relevant concept of irreparable damage and its pro-
per application in the context of interim measures ought to be reex-
amined and reevaluated. But before embarking on that, it is appro-
priate to show the effect of the Cyanamid rule in the subsequent 
English case law. The three cases briefly mentioned below will illus-
trate the difficulties which have been encountered in the application 
of the rule. 
The Cyanamid rule was shortly thereafter considered in 
Fellowes v. Fisher, 43 which involved an injunction to restrain a 
breach of a restrictive covenant between solicitors and their former 
conveyancing clerk who had covenanted not to take employment in 
any legal capacity within a fixed geographical area for five years 
after leaving the solicitors' office. All the members of the Court of 
Appeal: Browne, L.J ., Sir John Pennycuick, and Lord Denning, 
M.R. were convinced in varying degrees that the restrictive cove-
39. Id. at 410, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 512. 
40. Id. at 409, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 511. 
41. Id. at 406, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 508-09. 
42. See notes 43-63 infra and accompanying text. See also Wallington, supra note 2, at 
83-93; Gore, Interlocutory Injunctions·-A Final Judgment?, 38 MooERN L. REV. 672 (1975). 
43. [1976] Q.B. 122, [1975] 2 All E.R. 829 (C.A.). 
10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1977], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol4/iss2/2
1976-77] Injunctions and Interim Measures 287 
nant in question was unenforceable. 44 Before Cyanamid, the case 
could have been dismissed on the merits because the plaintiff would 
have had difficulties in making out a prima facie case. However, the 
allegation that the defendant had broken the covenant presented "a 
serious question to be tried," so that their Lordships could apply the 
Cyanamid rule. 45 
The court, however, denied the injunction unanimously, but for 
different reasons. Browne, L.J ., and Sir John Pennycuick, both 
applying the Cyanamid rule, based their denial of an injunction on 
the lack of evidence as to whether the plaintiff would suffer any 
irreparable harm if the injunction were refused. 46 Lord Denning, on 
the other hand, distinguished Cyanamid from Fellowes and pro-
ceeded to apply the old rule, maintaining that, since the plaintiff 
had not made out a prima facie case, no injunction could be 
granted.47 
The Cyanamid rule was again scrutinized in Hubbard v. Pitt, 48 
which involved an action by a company to restrain people who were 
picketing the company's offices while carrying allegedly defamatory 
placards and leaflets. Forbes, J ., had granted an injunction based 
upon the old rule, holding that a prima facie case of nuisance had 
been made out by the plaintiff. 49 On appeal, the injunction was 
upheld.50 The Court of Appeals, Stamp and Orr, L.JJ., relying on 
the evidence in the affidavit that the plaintiff's offices had been ob-
structed and its customers molested, applied the Cyanamid rule 
and found that there was "a serious question to be tried."51 Lord 
Denning, as in the Fellowes case, dissented and once again distin-
guished Hubbard from Cyanamid based on the "special factor" of 
44. See id. at 128-29, [1975] 2 All E.R. at 833 (Lord Denning); id. at 139-40, [1975] 2 
All E.R. at 842 (Browne, L.J.); id. at 142, [1975] 2 All E.R. at 844 (Sir John Pennycuick). 
45. Id. at 130, [1975] 2 All E.R. at 833. 
46. See id. at 139, [1975] 2 All E.R. at 842 (Browne, L.J.), and id. at 141, [1975] 2 All 
E.R. at 844 (Sir John Pennycuick). 
47. Id. at 133-34, [1975] 2 All E.R. at 836-38. Lord Denning felt that if either of two 
situations were present, the old rule of Stratford v. Lindley should be used. These two 
situations were: (1) if the individual case contained a "special factor" such as a labor strike, 
breach of covenant, or covenants in restraint of trade; or (2) if the case were one of 
"uncompensatable advantages" where damages for either side would not be an adequate 
remedy. Lord Denning found both a special factor, a covenant in restraint of trade, and that 
damages would not be sufficient. Id. 
48. [1976] Q.B. 142, [1975] 3 All E.R. 1 (C.A.). 
49. Id. at 160, [1975] 3 All E.R. at 6. 
50. Id. at 142, [1975] 3 All E.R. at 1. 
51. Id. at 188-90, [1975] 3 All E.R. at 19-20. 
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the free speech issue and applied the old rule.52 He expressly denied 
that a prima facie case had been made out by the plaintiff.53 Accord-
ingly, no injunction could be granted. 
The Cyanamid rule was further considered in Bryanston Fi-
nance Ltd. v. de Vries (No. 2), 54 in which the plaintiff, Bryanston 
Finance Company, sought an injunction against one of its share-
holders, Juda de Vries, to restrain him from presenting a petition 
to wind up the company. It was the company's view that the presen-
tation of such winding up proceedings by Mr. de Vries amounted to 
abuse of process. A preliminary injunction was granted by Megarry, 
J. 55 Later, when de Vries filed a motion to discharge the injunction 
claiming changed circumstances, Oliver, J., dismissed the motion. 58 
In a second action instituted by the company to restrain Mr. de 
Vries on the basis of further affidavits, Oliver, J ., granted an ex 
parte injunction, reasoning, within the meaning of Cyanamid, that 
a triable issue existed~namely that, if the action was brought to 
trial, the company might win.57 Mr. de Vries appealed both the 
dismissal of his motion by Oliver, J., in the first action and the ex 
parte injunction granted by the same judge in the second action. 
The Court of Appeal, Buckley, L.J., Stephenson, L.J., and Sir 
John Pennycuick, discharged the injunction with respect to the first 
action and allowed the appeal in the second action.58 In an opinion 
in which the other members of the Court of Appeal concurred, Buck-
ley, L.J., relied on the old rule and distinguished Cyanamid. 59 The 
court took the view that the plaintiff company had "not yet estab-
lished prima facie that it [had] the legal right which it [was] 
attempting to protect pending the trial.'' 80 According to the opinion, 
there was no sufficient evidence "to establish prima facie that the 
plaintiff [would] succeed in establishing that the proceedings 
sought to be restrained would constitute an abuse of process. " 81 
52. Id. at 178, [1975) 3 All E.R. at 10. Judge Stamp took issue with Lord Denning's 
opinion. He felt that "special factors" were only to be used in considering the "balance of 
convenience"; they did not justify a retreat from the rule in Cyanamid. Id. at 185, [1975) 3 
All E.R. at 16. 
53. Id. at 178, [1975) 3 All E.R. at 10. 
54. [1976) Ch. 63, [1976) 1 All E.R. 25 (C.A.). 
55. Id. at 70, [1976) 1 All E.R. at 29. 
56. Id. at 71, [1976) 1 All E.R. at 30. 
57. Id. at 71-72, [1976) 1 All E.R. at 30-31. 
58. Id. at 78, [1976) 1 All E.R. at 36. 
59. Id. at 76, [1976) 1 All E.R. at 34. 
60. Id. at 78, [1976) 1 All E.R. at 36. 
61. Id. 
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Thus, instead of applying the "triable issue" rule of Cyanamid, 
their Lordships relied upon the "prima facie" rule which allowed 
them to weigh the strength of the parties' arguments and defenses. 
But the court also observed that the second action, being in the 
nature of preventing the commencement of proceedings in limine, 
was in itself a "special factor" which needed to be considered as was 
observed by Lord Diplock in Cyanamid. 62 This special factor mili-
tated against the granting of an injunction in the case. 63 
The above three cases demonstrate that a reconsideration of the 
new rule is certainly going to continue in subsequent English cases 
with a view to ascertaining its application in commercial cases, as 
opposed to those involving intangibles such as civil liberties, and 
cases containing "special factors." 
C. The Test in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case: Reliance 
upon the Concept of Irreparable Harm 
In the recent Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, 64 the Interna-
tional Court of Justice applied the concept of "irreparable damage." 
This reflects the latest position of the Court with respect to the role 
of this concept in proceedings for interim measures. In order to 
establish a proper ground for analysis in this regard, it is necessary 
to present at length the relevant extracts of the Court's opinion. 
In a letter dated August 10, 1976, the government of Greece 
made an application to the Court submitting its dispute with Tur-
key over the Aegean continental shelf. In submitting the dispute to 
the Court, the Greek government cited, as the bases of jurisdiction, 
Article 17 of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes of 1928, 65 read together with Articles 36(1) and 37 
of the Statute of the Court, 66 and also a joint communique issued 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. [19761 I.C.J. 3 (Interim Protection). 
65. General Act for the Pacific Settlement oflnternational Disputes, done Sept. 26, 1928, 
art. 17, 93 L.N.T.S. 343. 
66. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para . 1, 37. Article 36 provides in part: 
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it 
and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in 
treaties and conventions in force. 
Article 37 provides that: 
Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a 
tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present 
Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice. 
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at Brussels on May 31, 1975. The dispute concerned the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf appertaining to Greece and Turkey in 
the Aegean Sea, and also concerned the respective legal rights of 
both Greece and Turkey to explore and exploit the Aegean continen-
tal shelf. Relying upon Article 33 of the General Act for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes of 1928, 67 on Article 41 of the 
Statute of the Court, 68 and on Article 66 of the Rules of the Court, 69 
the Greek government, in a letter also dated August 10, 1976, asked 
the Court to indicate interim measures of protection, pending the 
final decision in the case. In its application for interim measures, 
Greece alleged specifically that the granting by Turkey in 1973 of 
permits to the Turkish State Petroleum Company (TPAO) for ex-
ploration for petroleum covered an area which encroached upon the 
continental shelf claimed by Greece as appertaining to certain 
Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. At the time Greece submitted the 
dispute to the Court, the Turkish service research vessel, MTA 
Sismik I, was observed engaging in seismic exploration of areas of 
the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea claimed by Greece as apper-
taining to it. According to the Turkish government, the research 
vessel was expected to operate in the Turkish territorial waters and 
upon the high seas. The vessel was not to be accompanied by war-
ships, al though necessary measures were to be taken by Turkey to 
detect immediately any attack against the research vessel and to 
respond instantly in case of such attack. The government of Greece, 
however, contended that the activities of the Turkish research vessel 
constituted infring€ments of the exclusive sovereign rights of Greece 
to explore and exploit the continental shelf appertaining to Greece. 70 
These facts led Greece to seek interim measures of protection: 
"Greece ... requests the Court to direct that the Governments 
of both Greece and Turkey shall: 
(1) unless with the consent of each other and pending the final 
judgment of the Court in this case, refrain from all exploration 
activity or any scientific research, with respect to the continental 
shelf areas within which Turkey has granted such licences or per-
mits or adjacent to the Islands, or otherwise in dispute in the present 
case; 
67. General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, done Sept. 26, 1928, 
art. 33, 93 L.N .T.S. 343. 
68. I.C.J. STAT. art. 41. Article 41 is set out at text accompanying note 6 supra. 
69. I.C.J. R. 66. 
70. [1976] I.C.J. at 7, para. 16. 
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(2) refrain from taking further military measures or actions which 
may endanger their peaceful relations."71 
The Turkish government, in its August 25, 1976 communication 
to the Court, asserted that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the 
case.72 The Turkish government also contended that the interim 
measures requested by Greece were not required on the grounds, 
inter alia, that the exploration activities by Turkey could not be 
regarded as involving any prejudice to the existence of any rights of 
Greece over the disputed areas. Moreover, it was the view of the 
Turkish government that, even if it were admitted that Turkey's 
explorations did cause harm to the rights of Greece, there was no 
reason why such prejudice could not be compensated or why the 
explorations could affect the execution of any judgment which the 
Court might ultimately render. Referring to the request that both 
parties should "refrain from taking further military measures or 
actions which might endanger their relations," the Turkish govern-
ment stated that it had no intention of taking the initiative in the 
use of force. 73 Accordingly, the Turkish government requested the 
Court to dismiss Greece's application for interim measures and ap-
pointed no agent to represent it. 74 
Dealing first with the question of jurisdiction raised by Turkey, 
the Court found that at that stage it was not necessary to reach a 
final decision as to whether or not the 1928 General Act was applica-
ble as between Greece and Turkey. 75 The Court accordingly exam-
ined its jurisdiction under Article 41 of its Statute and found it had 
jurisdiction under that Article. The relevant portions of the Court's 
decision are as follows: 
22. Whereas the power of the Court to indicate interim 
measures under Article 41 of the Statute has as its object to preserve 
the respective rights of either party pending the decision of the 
Court; and whereas, in the present case, this power relates essen-
tially to the preservation of the rights which are invoked in Greece's 
Application; 
23. Whereas the several claims formulated in the submissions 
of the Greek Government in the Application are either different 
aspects or different incidents of its general claim to exclusive sover-
71. Id. at 4-5, para. 2. 
72. Id. at 5, para. 8. 
73. Id. at 8, para. 18. 
74. Id. at 5, para. 8. 
75. Id. at 8, para. 21. 
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eign rights of exploration and exploitation in certain areas of the 
continental shelf of the Aegean Sea; and whereas, therefore, it is 
essentially the preservation of those alleged rights of exploration and 
exploitation which concerns the Court in examining the present 
request for the indication of interim measures of protection; 
25. Whereas the power of the Court to indicate interim meas-
ures under Article 41 of the Statute presupposes that irreparable 
prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the subject of 
dispute in judicial proceedings and that the Court's judgment 
should not be anticipated by reason of any initiative regarding the 
matters in issue before the Court; 
26. Whereas, in this regard, the Greek Government contends 
that the concessions granted and the continued seismic exploration 
undertaken by Turkey in the areas of the continental shelf which are 
in dispute threaten to prejudice the exclusive sovereign rights 
claimed by Greece in respect of those areas; and whereas it further 
contends that Turkey's seismic exploration threatens in particular 
to destroy the exclusivity of the rights claimed by Greece to acquire 
information concerning the availability, extent and location of the 
natural resources of the areas; that the acquisition and dissemina-
tion of such information without the consent of Greece prejudices 
its negotiating position in relation to potential purchasers of exploi-
tation licences, thereby permanently impairing its sovereign rights 
with respect to the formulation of its national energy policy; 
27. Whereas, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the 
Greek Government maintains that the continued Turkish seismic 
exploration in the disputed areas constitutes a threat of irreparable 
prejudice to the rights claimed by Greece in its Application; that it 
threatens to prevent the full restoration of those rights to Greece in 
the event of its claims being upheld by the Court; and that the 
Court's power to indicate interim measures ought to be exercised 
when "the parties' rights might not be restored in full measure in 
the event of a judgment if that judgment is anticipated"; 
30. Whereas, according to the information before the Court, the 
seismic exploration undertaken by Turkey, of which Greece com-
plains, is carried out by a vessel traversing the surface of the high 
seas and causing small explosions to occur at intervals under water; 
whereas the purpose of these explosions is to send sound waves 
through the seabed so as to obtain information regarding the geo-
physical structure of the earth beneath it; whereas no complaint has 
been made that this form of seismic exploration involves any risk 
of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil or to their natural re-
sources; whereas the continued seismic exploration activities under-
16
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taken by Turkey are all of the transitory character just described, 
and do not involve the establishment of installations on or above the 
seabed of the continental shelf; and whereas no suggestion has been 
made that Turkey has embarked upon any operations involving the 
actual appropriation or other use of the natural resources of the 
areas of the continental shelf which are in dispute; 
31. Whereas seismic exploration of the natural resources of the 
continental shelf without the consent of the coastal State might, no 
doubt, raise a question of infringement of the latter's exclusive right 
of exploration; whereas, accordingly, in the event that the Court 
should uphold Greece's claims on the merits, Turkey's activity in 
seismic exploration might then be considered as such an infringe-
ment and invoked as a possible cause of prejudice to the exclusive 
rights of Greece in areas then found to appertain to Greece; 
32. Whereas, on the other hand, the possibility of such a preju-
dice to rights in issue before the Court does not, by itself, suffice to 
justify recourse to its exceptional power under Article 41 of the 
Statute to indicate interim measures of protection; whereas, under 
the express terms of that Article, this power is conferred on the 
Court only if it considers that circumstances so require in order to 
preserve the respective rights of either party; and whereas this con-
dition, as already noted, presupposes that the circumstances of the 
case disclose the risk of an irreparable prejudice to rights in issue 
in the proceedings; 
33. Whereas, in the present instance, the alleged breach by 
Turkey of the exclusivity of the right claimed by Greece to acquire 
information concerning the natural resources of areas of continental 
shelf, if it were established, is one that might be capable of repara-
tion by appropriate means; and whereas it follows that the Court is 
unable to find in that alleged breach of Greece's rights such a risk 
of irreparable prejudice to rights in issue before the Court as might 
require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to 
indicate interim measures for their preservation; 
THE COURT 
Finds, by 12 votes to 1, that the circumstances, as they now 
present themselves to the Court, are not such as to require the 
exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate 
interim measures of protection;78 
76. Id. at 9-11, 14, paras. 22-23, 25-27, 30-33. The Court was constituted as follows: 
President Jimenez de Arechaga; Vice-President Nagendra Singh; Judges Forster, Gros, 
Lachs, Dillard, Morozov, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Ruda, Mosler, Elias, Tarazi; Judge ad hoc 
Stassinopoulos. 
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Of the twelve judges voting with the majority, eight of them 
delivered separate opinions. Of the eight who delivered such opin-
ions, six of them (Judges Jimenez de Arechaga, Nagendra Singh, 
Morozov, Ruda, Mosler and Tarazi) considered the question of the 
Court's jurisdiction. They observed generally that had the Court 
been in a position to indicate interim measures, the Court would 
have been compelled to determine first whether or not it had juris-
diction over the merit of the case.77 
The test applied by the Court in rejecting Greece's request for 
interim measures was based on the concept of "irreparable harm." 
The Court found that Greece failed to show how the alleged activi-
ties of the Turkish research vessel would result in "irreparable 
harm" to Greece. 78 The Court emphasized that "the alleged breach 
by Turkey of the exclusivity of the right claimed by Greece to ac-
quire information concerning the natural resources of the areas of 
continental shelf, if it were established, is one that might be capable 
of reparation by appropriate means."79 By taking this position, the 
Court seemed to have agreed with Turkey that the alleged injury 
was compensable, and therefore the request by Greece for interim 
measures should be dismissed.80 The Court, adopting Turkey's con-
tention, took a similar position to the holding in Cyanamid, where 
the rule for interlocutory injunctions has been summarized by Wal-
lington: "if the plaintiff would be adequately compensated by dam-
ages which the defendant would be expected to meet, an injunction 
should be refused." 81 
The Court's reliance upon a showing of damage which cannot 
77. See note 29 supra. The Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case is a unique one in that 
Greece instituted proceedings in the Court as well as before the Security Council, thus seeking 
both legal and political relief. In its resolution of August 25, 1976, the Security Council urged 
both Greece and Turkey to "do everything in their power to reduce the present tensions in 
the area so that the negotiating process may be facilitated .... " 31 U .N. SCOR, 1953rd 
meeting para. 2 ( 1976). The Security Council also called upon the two states "to resume direct 
negotiations over their differences ... . "Id. para. 3. 
In its order of September 11, 1976, in which it refused to indicate interim measures, the 
Court did not address itself to the issue of the legal consequences of the Security Council 
resolution. Judge Lachs, in his separate opinion, took issue with the Court on this point. 
[1976] I.C .J. at 19-20. On the other hand, Judge Elias in his separate opinion took issue with 
the Court's heavier reliance upon the principle that the applicant must show "irreparable 
harm." Id. at 27-30. For a more extensive discussion of Judge Elias's opinion, see notes 82-86 
infra and accompanying text. 
78. [1976] I.C.J. at 11, para . 33. 
79. Id. 
80. See note 73 supra and accompanying text. 
81. Wallington, supra note 2, at 84. 
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be compensated either monetarily or in kind as a basis for indicating 
or refusing to indicate interim measures of protection was found to 
be an unacceptable test by Judge Elias, who filed a separate opinion 
relevant to our analysis.82 Judge Elias observed that the Court failed 
to maintain a sufficient balance between two elements whose proper 
consideration necessarily flows from the requirements of Article 41 
of the Statute of the Court which confers jurisdiction and power over 
the Court to indicate interim measures "if circumstances require." 
The two elements are: (1) the preservation of the respective rights 
of the parties to the dispute, and (2) the prevention of possible 
aggravation of the situation or expansion of the dispute. 83 In the 
opinion of Judge Elias, the Court failed to maintain a sufficient 
balance between these two elements because it appeared to lean 
more towards preservation of rights and less towards prevention of 
aggravation of the situation.84 The better standard to achieve a 
proper balance would be one requiring that "the parties to a case 
must abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudical 
effect in regard to the execution of the decision to be given and, in 
general, not allow any step of any kind to be taken which might 
aggravate or extend the dispute."85 Judge Elias concluded his opin-
ion by making the crucial point which is quoted with approval: 
Finally, the apparent acceptance by the majority of the Court 
that, once any damage resulting from the exploration and/or exploi-
tation by Turkey is capable of being compensated for in cash or 
kind, Greece cannot be said to have suffered irreparable damage 
does not seem to me to be a valid one. It means that the State which 
has the ability to pay can under this principle commit wrongs 
against another State with impunity, since it discounts the fact that 
the injury by itself might be sufficient to cause irreparable harm to 
the national susceptibilities of the offended State. The rightness or 
wrongness of the action itself does not seem to matter. This is a 
principle upon which contemporary international law should frown: 
might should no longer be right in today's inter-State relations. 88 
The above view illustrates clearly why the domestic rule gov-
erning the granting of injunctive relief, which relies heavily upon the 
82. [1976] l.C.J. at 27-30. 
83. Id. at 27. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 28-29, quoting from the standard laid down by the Permanent Court oflnterna-
tional Justice in The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, [1939] P.C.l.J., ser. A/B, 
No. 79, at 19. 
86. [1976] l.C.J. at 30. 
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plaintiff's and defendant's ability to make monetary reparations, is 
not suitable for international proceedings for interim measures. So 
long as this rule, which tends to equate "might" with "right," is 
applied in domestic proceedings, there is no reason why, in similar 
situations involving international relations, the argument against 
this rule should not be given serious consideration. The test re-
flected in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case ought to be viewed 
in the future with this point in mind. 
It should be emphasized, therefore, that the recognized need to 
preserve the status quo through the indication of interim measures 
ought not rely exclusively on the showing of irreparable harm. As 
one writer has also rightly observed, the remedy ought to be made 
available "in the event of other equally compelling reasons being 
found to exist, [but] where irreparable harm is not conclusively 
established. " 87 Such "equally compelling reasons" may be the desire 
to prevent the dispute from being aggravated or extended, as has 
been argued above. 
III. THE PROBLEM CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE ORDERS IND/CA TING INTERIM MEASURES 
Another critical difference between proceedings for interim 
measures under international law, and proceedings for interlocutory 
injunctions under domestic law, is the legal effect of the remedies 
granted under the two proceedings. A decision of a domestic court 
or tribunal granting an interlocutory injunction is binding upon the 
parties in the case. The legal effect of such a remedy, when war-
ranted by the circumstances and therefore not challengeable on that 
ground, is not a matter of controversy. However, the same is not true 
with respect to interim measures indicated by an international 
court. As discussed briefly below, whether or not properly prescribed 
interim measures constitute a binding decision upon parties to the 
dispute is still a matter of great controversy. 
A. The View that Orders Indicating Interim Measures are Binding 
Hambro has argued with some force that the provisional 
measures indicated by the International Court of Justice, for exam-
ple, are binding although not enforceable by the Security Council 
87. Goldie, The Nuclear Test Cases: Restraints on Environmental Harm , 5 J. MAR. L. 
& COM. 491 , 497 (1974). 
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within the meaning of the applicable United Nations Charter provi-
sions.RR This argument is first predicated on the author's claim that 
it would be an affront to the dignity of the Court, as the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations, to render decisions in conten-
tious cases which the parties are free to ignore at will.R9 The idea 
that the Court is expected to render decisions in contentious cases 
that are not binding, according to Hambro, could be entertained 
only if there were no other provisions of the United Nations Charter 
whose interpretation could be relied upon to reach the opposite 
conclusion. 90 Ham bro then finds that under Article 94 of the United 
Nations Charter, there is a possible interpretation which would ren-
der interim measures ordered by the International Court of Justice 
legally binding. Article 94 of the United Nations Charter states: 
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply 
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case 
to which it is a party. 
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incum-
bent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other 
party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it 
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures 
to be taken to give effect to the judgment.91 
Ambassador Hambro then makes an ingenious argument based 
upon his interpretation of the term "decision" used in Paragraph 1 
and the term "judgment" used in Paragraph 2 of Article 94 of the 
United Nations Charter. His argument is as follows: 
Here the first paragraph of Article 94 may be of some help. It 
is there stipulated that "Each Member of the United Nations under-
takes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Jus-
tice in any case to which it is a party." It is admitted, of course, that 
a literal interpretation of a treaty is not very satisfactory. But in this 
case two literal interpretations are confronted. The one says that 
interim measures cannot be binding because the second paragraph 
of our article only refers to 'judgments.' Such an e contrario inter-
pretation is not wholly convincing. It is more positive to say that the 
first paragraph imposes upon all members an obligation to comply 
with the 'decision' -any decision-of the Court, and that the second 
88. See Hambro, supra note 18, at 170-71. See also the view of the United Kingdom in 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1951] l.C.J. 89, 92-93. 
89. Hambro, supra note 18, at 165. 
90. Id. at 166. 
91. U.N. CHARTER art. 94. 
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paragraph lays down the rule that a failure to comply with the most 
important of the decisions, namely a 'judgment,' should set in mo-
tion the most important part of the machinery of the Organisation, 
namely the action of the Security Council, eventually developing 
into enforcement measures. It is, therefore, submitted that Article 
94 certainly does not indicate that the provisional measures are not 
of a binding character; and that it can be stressed to mean that the 
provisional measures are binding although not enforceable by the 
Council. 92 
The basic conclusion in the above text, with respect to the 
subject of this discussion, is that interim measures are binding, 
although not enforceable, by the Security Council. This conclusion 
is arrived at by drawing a clear distinction between the term 
"decision" and the term "judgment," the latter being considered 
more important than the former. 
It is, however, interesting to observe that, although Ambassa-
dor Hambro did not refer to it, Article 13, Paragraph 4 of the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations, which is comparable to Article 94 of 
the United Nations Charter, makes no such distinction. Article 13 
of the Covenant reads as follows: 
4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out 
in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and 
that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League 
which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out 
such an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps 
should be taken to give effect thereto. 93 
The clue offered in the above text prevents me from making 
much of Ambassador Hambro's argument that the provisional 
measures indicated by the International Court of Justice are bind-
ing in law although they cannot be enforced by the Security Coun-
cil. At best, in my view, the question is still wide open, as further 
shown below. 
B. The View that Orders Indicating Interim Measures of 
Protection are not Binding 
In a discussion which includes a legislative history of Article 41 
of the Statute of the PCIJ, it was once categorically observed that 
92. Hambro, supra note 18, at 168. 
93. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 13, para. 4. 
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"[ t]here is no question ~f a binding order. " 94 This is reinforced by 
the fact that, according to Article 59 of the Statute of the Court, 
only "decisions" of the Court have "binding force." 95 The view has 
been concurred in by many writers who have sought to prove that 
interim measures, which are "orders" and not "decisions," are not 
binding. The force of the argument runs as follows: Article 41 of the 
Statute of the Court96 uses terms such as "power to indicate"97 and 
"measures suggested."98 Thus, "the terms 'indicate' and 'suggest' 
employed in Article 41 exclude the interpretation that an order for 
interim measures has any binding force." 99 According to this view, 
the use of these two terms, which are arguably permissive, was a 
deliberate one establishing that provisional measures merely point 
out "what the parties must do in order to remain in harmony with 
what the Court holds to be the law." 100 As further argued, "[a]n 
indication does not have the force of res judicata. By Rule 66, the 
Court may at any time revoke or modify its 'decision' indicating 
interim measures of protection; rejection of the request does not 
preclude a fresh request." 101 The thrust of the argument is that the 
wording of Article 41 of the Statute of the Court leads to the unmis-
takable conclusion that interim measures indicated by the Court 
pursuant thereto are not binding. Thus, their enforceability is still 
open to question. 102 
94. E. DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 168 
(1932). 
95. l.C.J. STAT. art. 59. Article 59 goes on to provide that the Court's decisions are only 
binding "between the parties and in respect of that particular case." Id. 
96. Article 41 is set out in full at text accompanying note 6 supra. 
97. l.C.J. STAT. art. 41, para. 1. 
98. Id. art. 41, para. 2. 
99. Goldsworthy, supra note 26, at 273-74. 
100. E. DUMBAULD, supra note 94, at 168-69. 
101. Goldsworthy, supra note 26, at 274. See also E. DuMBAULD, supra note 94, at 168. 
102. The enforceability of interim measures was first argued in the Security Council 
when the United Kingdom raised the question of the failure of Iran to comply with the interim 
measures which the Court indicated upon the request of the United Kingdom in the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. Case . See Letter of September 28, 1951, from the United Kingdom to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2357 (1951). The United Kingdom was of the 
view that "[t]he finding of the Court on interim measures of itself gives rise to international 
obligations, obligations under the Charter, which it is the right and duty of the Security 
Council to uphold .... "Statement of Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the United Kingdom, 6 U.N. 
SCOR, 559th meeting para. 18 (1951). 
Iran took quite the opposite view and maintained, first, that the British application for 
interim measures was an "abusive use of process" and, second, that the decision of the Court, 
in granting the British request for interim measures before the Court had established its 
jurisdiction, was ill-advised and contrary to the Court's Statute. See Statement of Mr. Saleh 
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The view adopted in this Article is, therefore, that it is evi-
dently necessary to state specifically, in an instrument conferring 
jurisdiction to indicate interim measures upon an international 
forum, that such measures shall be binding as between the parties 
to the dispute and in respect of that particular case. Without such 
a specific provision on the binding nature of interim measures, an 
instrument conferring jurisdiction will be understood as having left 
the question open for competing interpretation as is presently the 
case with respect to Article 41. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The main purpose of this Article has been to offer a brief analy-
sis of the critical differences between the proceedings for interlocu-
tory injunctions under domestic law and proceedings for interim 
measures of protection under international law. In this final section 
of the Article, I will bring into focus once again the critical problems 
surrounding proceedings for interim measures under international 
law. 
First, on the issue of jurisdiction, I would like to emphasize the 
fact that, whatever test is applied, the following ought to be the 
desirable result: provisional measures should not be indicated un-
less the Court is certain of its competence on the merits of the case. 
Second, regarding the substantive rule governing what an ap-
plicant should be required to show, the following view seems reason-
able: there should not be exclusive reliance upon the showing or the 
failure to show irreparable or uncompensable harm. Where other 
compelling circumstances permit, and where no irreparable harm is 
positively shown, interim measures may be indicated. Thus, the 
prevention of exacerbation of a dispute pendente lite must remain 
an equally valid consideration as the preservation of the interests 
of the parties through the concept of irreparable harm. 
Third, on the question of the effectiveness of interim measures, 
the following view commands support: the wording of Article 41 of 
the Statute of the International Court leaves open the question of 
of Iran, 6 U.N. SCOR, 560th meeting paras. 43-47, 56 (1951). The Security Council, refraining 
from solving the problem as posed by the United Kingdom, merely decided to postpone its 
decision until the Court had settled its competence, which was challenged by Iran. See 6 U.N. 
SCOR, Res. & Dec., at 12 (1951). The Court finally declined jurisdiction, and the case did 
not come back to the Security Council. 
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the binding effect of the interim measures. The most reasonable 
interpretations given to that Article support the conclusion that 
interim measures indicated by the Court are not binding. Accord-
ingly, any international instrument conferring jurisdiction to an in-
ternational forum, which includes the power to indicate interim 
measures, must address itself to this issue. If the contracting parties 
to such treaty or convention intend the interim measures to be 
binding, they must include a specific provision to that effect in the 
clause conferring jurisdiction upon the forum in question. 
Finally, suggestions that the Court adopt the domestic practice 
of protecting the defendant's interest by asking the plaintiff to give 
an undertaking to compensate the defendant, where appropriate, 
require the most careful scrutiny. It may also be observed that too 
much emphasis upon monetary compensation in the context of in-
terim measures seems inadvisable. Where, for example, the contin-
ued exploitation of the respondent's natural resources by the appli-
cant is the question in dispute, the practice may have the undesira-
ble result of interim measures being indicated merely because the 
applicant has undertaken to compensate the respondent in a case 
where the benefits received by the applicant in securing the re-
straint far outweigh any compensation to the respondent. 
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